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or breaks in the skin. Hispanic
Americans may be more likely to
reside in agrarian settings with
increased exposure to soil and oppor-
tunities for contamination of cuts and
other injuries. Whether caused by
environmental factors, genetic predis-
position, access to medical care, or
other socioeconomic factors and pres-
sures, the reasons for the higher inci-
dence of BAE in Hispanic Americans
warrant further study. 
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To the Editor: Since its emer-
gence early in 2003, the epidemic of
severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) has been characterized by its
rapid spread among healthcare work-
ers. On August 14, 2003, the World
Health Organization (WHO) issued an
alert concerning SARS and recom-
mended a staged approach to surveil-
lance (1). Because occupational trans-
mission has been a feature of the
SARS outbreak, WHO recommends
surveillance for clusters of alert cases
among healthcare workers in low-risk
areas (i.e., cases not reported, only
imported cases reported, or local
cases with limited transmission poten-
tial reported). A SARS alert is identi-
fied when two or more healthcare
workers in the same healthcare unit
meet the clinical case definition of
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Figure. The graph compares Hispanic American populations and Hispanic American
Balamuthia amebic encephalitis (BAE) cases in the United States, California, and those
samples tested for Balamuthia antibody in the California Encephalitis Project (CEP). In
each of the three groups, the percentage of Hispanic Americans in the population is com-
pared to the percentage of BAE cases in Hispanic Americans.LETTERS
SARS with onset of illness in the
same 10-day period.
To determine the value of routinely
collecting worker absence data as part
of this kind of surveillance and to
assess a threshold level of possible
alert cases, directors of six major
Italian hospitals were asked for the
number of cases that fit the alert defi-
nition in 2003. (In Italy, the hospital
director is a physician who is in charge
of nosocomial and occupational infec-
tion control.) The facilities involved
were three general hospitals, two uni-
versity hospitals, and one research
hospital; each has an infectious and
respiratory tract diseases unit. Three of
four patients with imported cases of
probable SARS observed in Italy dur-
ing the 2003 epidemic (2) were treated
in two of these hospitals.
No hospitals were able to immedi-
ately provide the requested data; in all
hospitals in Italy, information on sick-
ness certificates is recorded only for
administrative purposes, and certifi-
cates are not generally used for med-
ical surveillance. The European
Union Council Directive 89/391
directs all participating countries to
introduce measures to improve work-
er safety and health and to provide a
designated service that will protect
workers, prevent occupational risks,
including hazards from biological
agents, and conduct health surveil-
lance. In the hospital, these activities
are coordinated by the hospital direc-
tor. When a worker has a transmissi-
ble disease, the attending physician
for the infected patient recommends
that the patient stay home from work
for the duration of the infectivity peri-
od. If the illness is included in the list
of notifiable infectious diseases, the
case must be reported to the local pub-
lic health authority so infection con-
trol measures can be implemented.
However, neither the attending physi-
cian nor public health personnel usu-
ally supervise home isolation, and
adherence to the recommendations
relies on the patient.
Sickness certificates are generally
provided by the physician and sent by
the worker to the hospital administra-
tion within 3 days of illness onset.
The certificate indicates the prognosis
(i.e., recommended number of days
absent from work) but does not report
the diagnosis because of privacy con-
cerns. In case of hospital admission,
the worker can send the hospital cer-
tificate (attesting to the duration of the
hospital stay), followed by a physi-
cian’s certificate for the recommend-
ed length of convalescence, if any.
To determine how the sickness cer-
tification system in other European
Union countries operates and assesses
the feasibility of the WHO alert sur-
veillance, we interviewed specialists
in infectious diseases or public health
in France (seven imported cases of
SARS, two in healthcare workers),
Spain (one case), and Denmark (no
cases) (2) by electronic mail.
According to their answers, the situa-
tion in those countries is not substan-
tially different from that in Italy.
In view of the increasing concern
related to the emergence and reemer-
gence of transmissible diseases, sur-
veillance efforts focused on groups
likely to be first affected by the
reemergence of SARS have been
strongly encouraged (3,4). Possible
alternatives similar to the SARS alert
system have been proposed, based on
healthcare workers’ sickness absen-
teeism, when other illnesses are con-
cerned. For example, the effectiveness
of enforced monitoring of pneumonia
in healthcare workers requiring hospi-
talization should be evaluated in the
context of a wider syndromic surveil-
lance strategy (5).
Although the current healthcare
worker sickness reporting system can-
not be fully representative and gener-
alizable, Italy and several other
European Union countries (e.g.,
France, Spain, and Denmark) do not
support initiating the WHO recom-
mendation and do not have the capac-
ity to detect and respond to SARS,
should it reemerge. To overcome bar-
riers to early detection of cases and
clusters of severe unexplained respi-
ratory infections that might signal the
reemergence of SARS, regulatory
changes are necessary, and efforts
should be made to balance the need
for protecting the privacy of persons
with the need for an effective surveil-
lance system. 
To identify clusters of occupational
diseases among healthcare workers
and provide prompt response to any
alert, an expanded sickness informa-
tion system should be implemented.
For example, an active confidential
assessment of diagnosis could be per-
formed in selected circumstances
when healthcare workers are absent.
We plan to evaluate the feasibility of
this kind of surveillance by focusing
on workers with absences with longer
than a week and on workers with onset
of illness in the same 10-day period. 
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SARS Outbreak 
in Taiwan
To the Editor: The article by
Hsieh et al. analyzed the daily case-
report data for severe acute respirato-
ry syndrome (SARS) from May 5 to
June 4, 2003, posted on the Web site
for the Taiwan Center for Disease
Control, to show how this disease had
rapidly spread in the 2003 outbreak
(1). Hsieh et al. suggested that infec-
tion in hospitalized patients who were
classified erroneously as suspected
SARS case-patients was a major fac-
tor in the rapid spread of the disease in
hospitals. Slow classification and
delayed placement of these patients in
negative-pressure isolation rooms
contributed to the high percentage
(73%) of nosocomial infection in
Taiwan (1). 
During the outbreak period (stage
II), three teams were responsible for
classifying SARS cases (2). The team
included infectious disease special-
ists, respiratory specialists, and epi-
demiologists recruited from major
teaching hospitals throughout Taiwan
and was organized by the Taiwan
Center for Disease Control and the
National Health Insurance Bureau.
The team met daily and reviewed the
clinical data, travel and contact histo-
ry, and chest radiographic scans of the
reported case-patients obtained (by
email or fax) from the patients’
attending physicians. The same proto-
col (Figure) was used by all team
members to classify the case-patients
as having suspected or probable
SARS. All hospitals that treated
patients with suspected SARS either
had their own committee to classify
patients according to World Health
Organization guidelines or followed
the protocol for classification or
reclassification of reported cases by
the team members (3). 
Although official reclassification
might have taken 12.5 days as sug-
gested by Hsieh et al., the conclusion
that inadequate isolation of infected
patients during this period led to a
higher rate of nosocomial transmis-
sion cannot be based on the data avail-
able to these authors. From the first
day that suspected cases were report-
ed to the Taiwan Center for Disease
Control, the patients were placed in
negative-pressure isolation rooms
when available. Suspected case-
patients may have been less likely
than probable case-patients to be
placed in negative-pressure isolation
rooms when these were in short sup-
ply; however, all other available isola-
tion precautions were used to treat
suspected case-patients before they
were reclassified. The notion that
increased infection transmission
occurred despite these isolation pre-
cautions is not consistent with the lit-
erature suggesting the central role of
gloves, gowns, and surgical masks in
preventing transmission (4). Thus, the
process of reclassification was not
associated with the timing of isolation
measures shown to have the greatest
impact in preventing infection trans-
mission. 
The high proportion of patients
with nosocomial SARS infection in
Taiwan is consistent with the observa-
tions of Lingappa et al. (5) and others
who have noted that the hospital set-
ting was the primary amplifier of
SARS transmission, with significant
community transmission occurring in
only the largest outbreaks. The high
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Figure. Flowchart of classification for severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) revised
on May 1, 2003. ARDS, acute respiratory distress syndrome.